

**Supply Chain Finance Through the Lens of Agency Theory:
A Literature Review**

Puti K. Indaswari

FIN 790

Dr. Haggard

July 14th, 2025

Abstract

Supply Chain Finance, or usually called SCF, has emerged as a tool to align incentives between buyers and suppliers by easing financial frictions and sharing benefits. This literature review, framed by agency theory, synthesizes findings on how SCF affects liquidity, bargaining dynamics, cash flow volatility, and inter-firm relationships. Prior studies indicate that SCF adoption improves firms' liquidity and working capital positions by alleviating financing constraints and optimizing cash conversion cycles (Smith 2024; Phraknoi, Busby, and Stevenson 2022). Through an agency theory lens, SCF can mitigate conflicts and moral hazards inherent in supply chain relationships, though misaligned implementation risks remain (Panda and Leepsa 2017).

Keywords: Supply Chain Finance (SCF), Agency Theory, Working Capital, Bargaining Dynamics, Buyer-Supplier Relationship

Introduction

In global supply chains, buyers and suppliers often face misaligned financial incentives that can lead to conflicts reminiscent of the classic agency problem. Agency theory addresses such conflicts of interest and information asymmetries in organizational relationships (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Panda and Leepsa (2017) provide a comprehensive review of agency theory, which suggests that conflicts arise from divergent risk preferences, information asymmetry, and moral hazard. For example, a powerful buyer might delay payments to optimize its own cash flow, harming the supplier's liquidity, which become a solid conflict of interest. Agency theory

suggests that aligning the incentives of these parties or introducing mechanisms to monitor or bond their performance, can mitigate such conflicts (Eisenhardt 1989; Panda and Leepsa 2017)

SCF has gained prominence as a practical mechanism to realign financial incentives between supply chain partners. Broadly defined, SCF is a set of financing solutions that optimize cash flow in the supply chain by leveraging the credit strength of one party (often a large buyer) to improve another party's liquidity (often smaller supplier). Common SCF arrangements include reverse factoring (where buyer-initiated programs that allow suppliers to receive early payment on invoices through a bank or platform) and inventory financing (using inventory as collateral for loans). By design, these solutions address the agency conflict over payment timing: the buyer can extend its payment period to meet its working capital goals, while the supplier, via the SCF program, still gets paid promptly by a financier. In theory, both parties benefit; the buyer improves its cash conversion cycle, and the supplier gains quick access to cash, which is more advantageous in aligning more incentives than under traditional trade credit terms. Thereby, SCF binds the parties in a financial arrangement that can reduce opportunistic behaviors and share value created by better financial management.

This review examines existing literature on SCF through the lens of agency theory to understand how SCF adoption impact four key areas: (1) firm liquidity and working capital, (2) bargaining power between large buyers and small suppliers, (3) volatility of working capital, and (4) inter-firm relationship quality. By combining findings from recent studies, I illustrate how SCF serves as an incentive-alignment mechanism, as well as potential downfalls if misused, along with outlining opportunities for further research on SCF. Throughout the paper, I am applying agency theoretic insights such as incentive alignment, risk sharing, and trade-off between

contractual power and relational governance to interpret evidence. In doing so, I highlight how SCF can be a means of mitigating the “agency cost” in supply chain relationships (e.g., costs due to distrust or conflicting objectives), consistent with Panda and Leepsa’s (2017) emphasis on solutions that diminish agency costs. All sources for this review are drawn from recent scholarly work on SCF and related supply chain topics.

Literature Review

Agency theory provides a useful framework for analyzing buyer-supplier relationships because it focuses on incentive misalignment and mechanisms to curb opportunism. A typical agency scenario involves a principal and an agent; in supply chains, we can analogize a large buying firm as a principal who relies on an upstream supplier (the agent) to perform critical tasks (e.g. produce components). While this analogy is imperfect, since buyers and suppliers contract at arm’s length (avoiding getting close to friendly) than within one firm, many of the same issues arise: information asymmetry, risk transfer, and goal conflict. Panda and Leepsa (2017) emphasize that whenever one party’s depends on another’s actions, agency problems can emerge, often reduced by contracts or governance structures. In supply chains, formal contracts specify terms like price and payment due dates, but they may not fully align the parties’ financial goals. For instance, a buyer might benefit from holding onto cash longer (increasing its accounts payable period), whereas the supplier prefers to be paid sooner to fund operations. This creates a classic agent tension over cash flow timing and risk-bearing.

SCF can be seen as an agency mechanism that aligns incentives through financial innovation. By introducing a third-party financier or technology platform, SCF arrangements effectively reallocate risk and liquidity in a way that benefits both sides. An example in a reverse factoring program, a bank pays the supplier's invoice soon after it is issued (so the supplier gains liquidity and certainty of payment), and the buyer pays the bank later at an agreed extended due date (so the buyer gains a longer payment period without hurting the supplier). The bank charges a small fee or interest, often based on the buyer's strong credit rating, meaning the supplier gets cheaper financing than it could on its own. From an agency's perspective, this reduces the information asymmetry problem: the bank's willingness to lend is based on the more transparent credit risk of the large buyer than the less well-known risk of a smaller supplier. It also lessens moral hazard and opportunism. The buyer has less incentive to delay payment unfairly since the payment terms are contractually set in the SCF program, and the supplier is assured of timely cash, making it less likely to underperform or renegotiate under coercion.

Moreover, agency theory reminds us that if one party holds significantly more power, they may extract disproportionate gains ("agency rents") at the expense of the weaker party. In supply chains, larger buyers often have such power over smaller suppliers due to resources dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). However, agency theory also suggests that the long-term interest of the principal can be served by not completely exploiting the agent, especially when cooperation yields greater total value (Eisenhardt 1989). Several SCF researches explicitly or implicitly draw on these ideas. For example, Hofmann and Kotzab (2010) argue that a power firm's exploitation of its advantage (e.g., by continually pushing longer payment terms) can damage the long-run sustainability of the relationship. On the other hand, a cooperative approach such as sharing

financial benefits or ensuring the suppliers viability can improve overall supply chain performance. This balance between the use of power while maintaining partnership mirrors the agency theory tension between short-term self-interest and long-term joint value maximization.

SCF and Firm Liquidity/Working Capital

One of the clearest benefits of adopting supply chain finance programs is improved liquidity and working capital. SCF initiatives are explicitly designed to optimize cash flow and enhance financial efficiency across the supply chain. By allowing companies to adjust payment timings via third-party financing, SCF improves the availability of cash and short-term assets. In other words, it strengthens working capital positions. Smith (2024) emphasize that by integrating financial process with supply chain activities, organizations can eliminate risks, improve liquidity, and strengthen supplier relationships. SCF techniques like reverse factoring enable buyers to extend payment terms without harming their suppliers' cash flow, since suppliers can opt to receive early payment from a financier. This effectively transfers liquidity from the buyer or financing partner to the supplier when needed, while still allowing the buyer to utilize longer payables periods to boost its own working capital. Arrangement aligns the buyer's and supplier's interest: the buyer achieves a lower cash conversion cycle (CCC) and the supplier gets faster cash conversion from receivables. Neither party has to lose out for the other to benefit, reducing the zero-sum nature from working capital negotiations.

Empirical evidence supports these liquidity advancements. For example, Tanrisever et al. (2012) found that reverse factoring has potential to unlock more than 10% of an SME's working capital

and significantly improve its operational performance (as reported in Phraknoi et al. 2022). Such gains are substantial for cash-constrained suppliers. In a broad survey of SCF research, Gelsomino et al. (2016) and others note that SCF encompasses tools like inventory financing, dynamic discounting, and extensions of trade credit, all aimed at better managing cash flow and working capital in the inter-firm context. A focal company that successfully implements SCF can thus reduce the capital tied up in inventory and receivables, accelerating its cash cycle. Cho et al. (2019) observe that firms with greater bargaining power tend to use that power to shorten their own CCC by expediting collections and delaying payments. In traditional terms, this could hurt the other party; however, SCF offers a cooperative twist by substituting a financier in place of an exploited partner. Rather than simply forcing a supplier to wait longer (which increases the supplier's receivables and working capital burden), a buyer with an SCF program can achieve a similar extension of its payables while the supplier is promptly paid by the bank. Both companies' liquidity can improve: the buyer holds cash longer, and the supplier converts receivables to cash faster.

From the supplier perspective, participation in SCF can substantially alleviate financial constraints. A study by Lou et al. (2024) on Chinese SMEs provides quantitative evidence: they show that firms using SCF exhibit significantly lower cash-cash flow sensitivity, meaning their cash holdings are less constrained by internal cash flow thanks to external financing access. In practical terms, SCF gives smaller suppliers easier and cheaper access to credit, which improves their liquidity to fund operations and investments. Lou et al. (2024) highlight that SCF arrangements eliminate certain information asymmetries between SMEs and banks, and that long-term stable cooperation with core firms mitigates the need for emergency external

funds. By borrowing against future receivables from a trustworthy large buyer, a supplier can enhance its financial capability to secure funding. This finding resonates strongly with agency theory: the supplier (agent) becomes more capable of fulfilling the principal's needs (steady supply, quality production) because its financing is assured, thereby aligning the supplier's ability to perform with the buyer's interests.

Notably, the benefits of SCF on liquidity are context dependent. Lou et al. find that private and smaller enterprises gain relatively more from SCF than state-owned or larger firms (who may already have better credit access). This suggests SCF's role is especially crucial in leveling the playing field by providing financing to those who otherwise face higher capital costs, again an incentive alignment, as it enables financially weaker agents to participate more robustly in the supply chain. Overall, across numerous studies, the consensus is that SCF adoption improves working capital metrics (like the current ratio and cash conversion cycle) and boosts liquidity for both buyers and suppliers in the chain. These improvements reduce the frictions that often pit buyer and supplier against each other over payment timing, thus directly addressing the first research question.

SCF and Bargaining Power Dynamics

The introduction of SCF into a buyer-supplier relationship can alter the balance of power, sometimes in favor of large buyers, but with important nuances. Traditionally, large buyers hold bargaining power due to their scale and the dependence of smaller suppliers on their business (resource dependence theory, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This power can be used to demand

better financial terms, for instance, longer payment periods or volume-based discounts, effectively shifting more working capital burden onto suppliers. Agency theory would view such unilateral power moves as the principal exploiting the agent, which can increase the agent's costs or risks. Indeed, prior to the advent of formal SCF programs, cases were documented where buyers abused their power in ways that severely strained suppliers. A notorious example is the 2018 Carillion collapse in the UK: Carillion, a large contractor, had used a reverse factoring SCF arrangement to enforce very long payment terms on its suppliers, masking its own financial distress; when Carillion went bankrupt, it owed about £2 billion to 30,000 SME suppliers who had been coerced into waiting extended periods for payment. This episode underscores that SCF, if misused as a smokescreen for aggressive term extension, can exacerbate power imbalances, which is when the buyer leveraged SCF to push its cash crunch onto vulnerable suppliers. Similarly, the 2021 Greensill Capital scandal revealed how the unchecked expansion of SCF (and related financing) can create systemic risks, again often benefitting powerful buyers and intermediaries at the expense of suppliers and financial partners (Wass 2021).

However, the academic literature also provides a more balanced and optimistic view: SCF need not be purely a tool of buyer dominance; it can also promote more collaborative power-sharing. Cho, Ke, and Han (2019) examine how firms use bargaining power in the context of SCF and the resultant supply chain financial performance. They found that a focal firm with superior power does tend to claim an extra share of financial gains (e.g. by lengthening payables or reducing its inventory costs), essentially capitalizing on its power advantage. This is consistent with a self-interested principal maximizing its utility. Importantly, though, their study also found that when long-term collaboration is crucial, powerful firms proactively restrain the exercise of

power to maintain a cooperative relationship. In other words, if the buyer values the supplier's ongoing performance and innovation, it may willingly forgo some short-term financial advantage to keep the relationship healthy. This behavior aligns with agency theory's notion that principals will sometimes design incentives (or moderate their demands) to ensure the agent's interests are satisfied enough to induce desired performance (e.g. not squeezing the supplier to the point of failure or disengagement).

Identifying two mechanisms in SCF relationships: a bargaining (power-based) mechanism and a cooperative mechanism. Under the bargaining mechanism, a firm uses power asymmetry to reduce its cost of capital, for instance, by obtaining more favorable trade credit terms, shortening its cash conversion cycle by delaying outflows and accelerating inflows. This is evident in common practices: a powerful buyer might dictate longer payment terms (increasing its accounts payable days) and push inventory holding upstream to suppliers or downstream to distributors, thereby improving the buyer's own working capital metrics. SCF can facilitate these moves: for example, through inventory financing programs a buyer may ask a supplier to hold extra stock, but the supplier gets financing support to do so. The risk, as noted by multiple scholars, is that over-reliance on bargaining power can undermine trust and goodwill. Hofmann and Kotzab (2010) warned that exploiting power asymmetry "may damage the long-term sustainability of the vertical relationships," essentially, the agent may retaliate or withdraw effort if treated unfairly.

So does SCF shift bargaining power? On one hand, SCF enables large buyers to leverage their strength (credit rating, financial resources) to their advantage, which could increase their power. A buyer-led SCF program might lock in suppliers, making the suppliers more dependent on the buyer's continued support (and possibly on the buyer's financial health). Indeed, Phraknoi et al.

(2022) report that some SME suppliers perceive loss of control when joining a buyer's SCF program, as it entangles their financing with the buyer's platform and potentially signals their weakness to the buyer. One supplier in their interviews feared that accessing reverse factoring might send a negative signal to the buyer about the supplier's own cash position. Such concerns indicate that SCF can make suppliers feel more beholden to powerful buyers, which an increase in the buyer's bargaining power in relational terms.

On the other hand, SCF can also empower suppliers in certain ways. By alleviating capital constraints, a small supplier becomes financially more robust and less susceptible to coercion on payment terms (since they know they have alternative financing). Furthermore, a benevolent use of SCF by a buyer, for example, sharing some of the financing cost savings with suppliers in the form of better prices or services, which can build goodwill. Cho et al. (2019) suggest that when cooperation is prioritized, a powerful firm's strategic restraint of power can lead to better joint outcomes. They frame it as a contingent use of power: in "mutually dependent" situations, even a powerful buyer will limit exploitative behavior to avoid damaging the relationship and causing financial harm that could backfire on its own performance. This reflects a sophisticated understanding of power, that it's not only the possession of power but the exercise of it that matters. Agency theory would concur rational principals will not over-exploit agents if doing so ultimately reduces the agent's ability or willingness to deliver value (Shapiro 2005).

In summary, SCF can shift bargaining dynamics by giving large buyers new leverage (e.g. the ability to extend terms under the cover of supplier-friendly financing). Nonetheless, awareness is growing that excessive use of this leverage is counterproductive. The best outcomes in SCF implementations seem to occur when power is balanced by collaboration. A recent empirical

study by Cho et al. (2019) using a large dataset found evidence that firms do balance these approaches: power asymmetry led to shorter CCC for the focal firms (a sign of successful bargaining), but this effect was moderated when high interdependence or strategic partnership considerations were present (suggesting restraint). Therefore, the presence of SCF alone doesn't guarantee a fair distribution of power; what matters is how the program is structured and governed. If aligned with agency theory's prescriptions, e.g. transparency to reduce information asymmetry, incentive-compatible terms so both sides benefit; SCF can turn a potentially coercive situation into a more equitable one. But if used merely as a tool of coercion (as in Carillion's case), SCF can magnify power imbalances under a veneer of providing help. Future research can further explore governance mechanisms to ensure SCF programs are implemented in ways that truly balance bargaining power.

SCF and Working Capital Volatility

One under-explored benefit of SCF is its potential to reduce volatility in firms' working capital and cash flows. Working capital volatility refers to the fluctuations in a company's short-term assets and liabilities over time, high volatility can indicate uncertainty in cash flows, making it hard to meet obligations or plan investments. Participation in SCF can smooth these fluctuations in several ways. First, SCF provides companies (especially suppliers) with more predictable access to cash. Instead of waiting an uncertain number of days for payment, which could be subject to delays or early payments depending on the buyer's situation, when a supplier in a reverse factoring program knows it can convert receivables to cash almost immediately after invoicing.

Furthermore, SCF can substitute for costly short-term debt that firms might otherwise use to plug liquidity gaps. For example, rather than relying on an overdraft facility (with variable interest and usage), a supplier could regularly use invoice financing for all its large buyers' invoices. This kind of routine, programmatic financing leads to more stable working capital because it's built into the supply chain process, unlike ad hoc loans taken only when cash is tight. The result is a more consistent working capital cycle.

Another angle is how SCF redistributes risk in the supply chain. Agency theory often discusses risk-sharing between principal and agent; SCF can shift certain risks to parties best able to bear them. For instance, in a typical SCF arrangement, credit risk associated with the supplier (i.e. the risk the supplier won't repay a loan) is largely transferred to the buyer and financier. The supplier's funding via SCF is usually guaranteed by the buyer's commitment to pay, so the financier's risk is tied to the buyer's default risk (usually lower) rather than the supplier's. This risk transfer means the supplier's financing is more secure and less subject to its own volatility or credit swings. Likewise, if a supplier faces seasonal demand (hence seasonal working capital needs), SCF can absorb that by providing seasonal financing (e.g. more invoices factored during peak season). Without SCF, the supplier's own cash flow would whipsaw between seasons; with SCF, the swings are mitigated by external funding that ebbs and flows as needed. Essentially, SCF externalizes and pools risks that would otherwise cause volatility for individual firms, analogous to how insurance pools risk to stabilize outcomes for policyholders.

Direct empirical evidence on SCF reducing measured working capital volatility is still emerging, but the consistent theme is risk mitigation. Pfohl and Gomm (2009) posited early on that SCF could decrease the variance in cash flow for suppliers by ensuring timely payments. More

recently, practitioners note that companies using SCF report more predictable cash forecasts, since payment dates and amounts become more certain. The resilience findings by Zheng et al. (2025) also imply that firms using SCF had more stable operations during 2017-2023, a period including disruptions like the COVID-19 pandemic, than those that did not. Notably, their study also found heterogeneity: firms in intensely competitive industries saw greater resilience gains from SCF, possibly because in cutthroat markets, smoothing cash flow can be the difference between survival or not during downturns.

In sum, participation in SCF tends to reduce working capital volatility by offering financial flexibility and predictability. This aligns incentives by removing some of the financial uncertainty that could cause either party to behave opportunistically.

SCF and Inter-Firm Relationships

Perhaps the most nuanced impact of supply chain finance is on the quality of relationships between buyers and suppliers. Inter-firm relationships in supply chains are often characterized by dimensions like trust, commitment, power balance, and mutual dependence (Nyaga and Whipple 2011; Qian, Seuring, and Wagner 2021). The introduction of SCF can influence these dimensions both positively and negatively. On one side, SCF can serve as a relational enhancer: a well-implemented SCF program signals that the buyer is concerned about the supplier's financial well-being and is willing to collaborate for mutual gain. On the other side, if mismanaged, SCF can introduce tensions or suspicions, for example if the supplier feels coerced into joining the program or fears hidden motives.

SCF “fosters better relationships with suppliers by improving their financial stability and creating a more collaborative, mutually beneficial business environment,” according to Smith (2024). When a buyer sponsors an SCF program (such as reverse factoring), it often strengthens the partnership: the supplier gains confidence that the buyer truly values a long-term relationship, as evidenced by facilitating early payments and lower financing costs. This can increase trust, which is a key relational attribute. In agency theory terms, the buyer is effectively sharing the surplus (in form of lower capital cost or improved cash flow) with the supplier, which can reduce perceptions of opportunism. Indeed, multiple studies note that trust and commitment tend to improve when firms engage in collaborative financial arrangements. By assuring suppliers of timely payment and involving a transparent platform, SCF reduces the uncertainty that might otherwise require costly trust-building measures. As one example, a case study of Siemens’ SCF program (Wuttke et al. 2013b) reported improved supplier satisfaction and loyalty after implementation, because suppliers saw the program as a sign of support from the buyer.

Relational benefits of SCF also extend to information sharing and joint decision-making. Pfohl and Gomm (2009) argued that successful SCF requires a higher degree of data transparency between buyer and supplier (e.g. sharing invoice statuses, shipment confirmations, etc. on a platform). This increased transparency can spill over into other areas of the relationship, fostering a culture of openness. In addition, as parties work together to optimize the supply chain financially, they often need to coordinate operationally (e.g. synchronizing delivery schedules with financing schedules). Such coordination can enhance overall relationship quality by increasing the frequency and quality of contact between firms. Relational contracting theory (a complement to agency theory) would say that this creates a self-reinforcing cycle: the more firms

invest in relation-specific arrangements like SCF, the more both have a stake in keeping the relationship strong and dispute-free.

However, we still have to be cautious that SCF can introduce new forms of inter-firm tension if not handled carefully. One concern, as highlighted by Phraknoi et al. (2022), is the perception issue among suppliers. Their in-depth interviews with SME suppliers and distributors revealed that these smaller actors often worry about the non-financial implications of joining SCF schemes. For instance, a supplier might be reluctant to use a buyer's SCF program because it fears being seen as financially weak (needing early payment could signal cash flow problems) or losing independence (relying on the buyer's bank and platform for funds could tether them more tightly to the buyer). Such perceptions can erode trust if not addressed. An SME may wonder: "Is the buyer offering SCF to help me, or to tighten their control over me?" This doubt can undermine the goodwill that SCF is supposed to generate. Agency theory suggests that when one party is very dependent on the other (the agent's outside options are limited), the power dynamic can breed suspicion and reduce cooperation. Therefore, if a supplier feels too dependent on the buyer due to SCF (e.g. all its financing comes via the buyer's scheme), the relationship could suffer unless counterbalanced by trust-building measures or contractual safeguards.

Another potential relational downside is if SCF is implemented in a way that suppliers perceive as unfair. For example, if the financing costs, though lower than the supplier's alternatives, are still substantially shouldered by the supplier, they may feel the buyer is taking a disproportionate share of benefits. In a healthy relationship, benefits should be shared in line with contributions (equity principle). Agency theory aligns with this: if the agent feels the contract is unfair, they may shirk or exit. Empirical evidence is telling here, that Wuttke et al. (2019) found instances of

suppliers declining to participate in buyer-led SCF programs because the offered discount rate on invoices (effectively the interest rate for early payment) was not attractive, or because the buyer concomitantly pushed out payment terms further, offsetting the benefits. Such scenarios can make suppliers feel coerced rather than helped, clearly damaging trust.

Despite these concerns, many studies conclude that, on balance, SCF can strengthen inter-firm ties when managed openly. The cooperative approach discussed earlier plays a big role. If the buyer introduces SCF as part of a broader partnership philosophy, perhaps even involving suppliers in the design of the program, which cause the relational outcome is likely positive. Relational exchange theory would predict higher relationship quality (including satisfaction, trust, and commitment) when both parties perceive the exchange as mutually beneficial and fair. The example of a benevolent power use comes to mind: Narasimhan and colleagues (2009) observed that a supplier with power sometimes offers benevolent pricing to signal it won't exploit partners, building long-term goodwill. Analogously, a powerful buyer might implement SCF not just to boost its own working capital but to improve supplier financial health, signaling a commitment to the supplier's success (a form of benevolence). This is corroborated by Cho et al.'s note that "alleviating financial burdens on smaller partners can help avoid" negative outcomes in the network, essentially, by easing the agent's burden, the principal engenders loyalty and reliability.

In conclusion, SCF influences inter-firm relationships by either aligning incentives and fostering trust, when done in a transparent, win-win manner, or by possibly increasing dependency and suspicion, when one-sided.

Conclusion

Overall, I believe that firms should approach SCF not merely as a financial tactic but as a strategic means to create a more collaborative, resilient supply chain, where both the principal and agent prosper. The evidence reviewed: spanning liquidity improvements (e.g. Wuttke et al. 2016), empirical power-dynamics (Cho, Ke, and Han 2019), risk reduction (Acharya and Marathe 2020; Zheng et al. 2025), and relational outcomes (Phraknoi et al. 2022), converges on the idea that well-aligned financial incentives can transform buyer-supplier relationships. Especially, supply chain finance, when grounded in agency theory insights, is more than a set of financing techniques; it is a governance tool that aligns economic incentives and strengthens inter-firm bonds, ultimately enhancing the efficiency and stability of the entire supply chain.

References

- Review of Acharya, Vivek, and Siddharth Marathe. 2020. "Supply Chain Finance: The Future of Working Capital Optimization." *Journal of Supply Chain Finance*, 5(2): 23–37.
- Cho, Woohyun, Jian-yu Fisher Ke, and Chaodong Han. 2019. "An Empirical Examination of the Use of Bargaining Power and Its Impacts on Supply Chain Financial Performance." *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management* 25 (4): 100550.
- Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. 1989. "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review." *Academy of Management Review* 14 (1): 57–74.
- Gelsomino, Luca M., Erik Hofmann, Alessandro Caniato, Maria Huge Brocke, and Antonella Luzzini. 2016. "Supply Chain Finance: A Literature Review and Future Research Directions." *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management* 46 (4): 348–366.
- Hofmann, Erik, and Herbert Kotzab. 2010. "A Supply Chain-Oriented Approach of Working Capital Management." *Journal of Business Logistics* 31 (2): 305–330.
- Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." *Journal of Financial Economics* 3 (4): 305–360.
- Lou, Zhaohui, Qizhuo Xie, Jim Huangnan Shen, and Chien-Chiang Lee. 2024. "Does Supply Chain Finance Alleviate Funding Constraints of SMEs? Evidence from China." *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal* 79: 102105.
- Panda, Brahmadev, and N. M. Leepsa. 2017. "Agency Theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives." *Indian Journal of Corporate Governance* 10 (1): 74–95.
- Phraknoi, Nichapa, Jerry Busby, and Mark Stevenson. 2022. "The Relational Focus of Small and Medium-Sized Actors' Understandings of Supply Chain Finance." *International Journal of Operations & Production Management* 42 (9): 1435–1466.
- Pfohl, Hans-Christian, and Matthias Gomm. 2009. "Supply Chain Finance: Optimizing Financial Flows in Supply Chains." *Logistics Research* 1 (3–4): 149–161.
- Smith, Hussein K. 2024. *Supply Chain Finance and Working Capital Management*. Research Gate.
- Wuttke, David A., Christian Blome, Michael Henke, and Erik Hofmann. 2013. "Extending the Finance–Supply Chain Nexus: The Supply Chain Finance Triangle." *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management* 43 (5–6): 436–456.

Zheng, Mengze, Rui Wang, Jing Ye, and Te Li. 2025. "How Does Supply Chain Finance Enhance Firms' Supply Chain Resilience?" *International Economics & Finance* 102: 104231.